Gambella is once again watching Ethiopia’s political crisis from a difficult position. Renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia, including Tigray and neighbouring Afar, has come only days after seven armed and opposition groups announced a coalition seeking to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and establish a transitional administration.

The coalition brings together the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Amhara Fano National Movement, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement and Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement.

The timing is significant. Fighting has now intensified between federal forces and Tigrayan forces, while clashes and military activity have also affected neighbouring Afar and Amhara areas.

Ethiopian Airlines suspended flights to Tigray after the escalation, while reports emerged of Tigrayan forces taking control of several airports and the district capital of Abala in Afar. The United Nations has called for restraint and a return to dialogue, warning that military action will not resolve Ethiopia’s underlying political differences.

For Gambella, however, the most important question is not simply who is winning in the north. It is what kind of Ethiopia could emerge if the current confrontation expands.

• Gambella caught between competing visions

The political argument now unfolding in Ethiopia can be understood through several competing visions of the country’s future.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party continue to present the federal government as the institution responsible for maintaining the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and managing the country as one state.

The armed groups opposing the government, meanwhile, argue that the existing political order has concentrated too much power at the centre and failed to resolve longstanding regional and political grievances.

Their new coalition says it wants to remove the current government and establish a transitional administration before a broader constitutional and political process.  But the seven groups are not a single ideological movement. Their histories, regional interests and political objectives are different. The TPLF and Fano, for example, fought on opposite sides during the 2020-2022 Tigray war.

The OLA has its own long-running conflict with the federal government, while the other coalition members represent different regional and political grievances.

Analysts have therefore questioned how easily these groups could transform their common opposition to Abiy’s government into a unified political project. That distinction matters for Gambella. It is tempting to divide Ethiopia into two camps, those fighting for a united Ethiopia and those supposedly fighting for independence.

The reality is more complicated. The present coalition itself speaks of a transitional government rather than announcing a single programme for dissolving Ethiopia into independent states.

What happens after such a transition, if it ever occurs, would depend on negotiations over the constitution, federalism, territory, political representation and the relationship between the federal government and the regions.

For Gambella, those questions are not abstract.

• What happens to Gambella if the centre weakens?

Gambella has historically depended heavily on the federal government for security, administration, infrastructure, humanitarian coordination and political support. At the same time, the region has repeatedly experienced tensions over local authority, inter-communal violence, displacement, armed groups and the relationship between regional and federal institutions.

A major weakening of the federal state could therefore create both opportunities and risks. On one hand, a weaker centre could give regional governments greater political space to determine their own affairs.

For a region such as Gambella, which has its own distinct political, cultural and geographic realities, stronger regional autonomy could be attractive if it comes through a negotiated constitutional process. On the other hand, a collapse or severe weakening of federal authority could expose peripheral regions to greater insecurity.

Gambella’s location on Ethiopia’s western border means that instability in neighbouring regions could have consequences for the movement of weapons, armed groups, refugees, trade and civilians.

A national political crisis that begins in the north would not necessarily remain a northern problem. This is where Gambella’s dilemma becomes particularly serious.

If Abiy’s government maintains a strong central state through military means, Gambella may retain a powerful federal security structure, but the continuation of armed conflicts elsewhere could keep Ethiopia under permanent political and economic pressure.

If the anti-government coalition succeeds in weakening or removing the current administration, Gambella could gain a new political opening, but nobody can guarantee what constitutional arrangement would follow, how regional boundaries would be treated, or whether the new political order would be more stable.

Neither scenario provides Gambella with certainty.

• The seven-group coalition is not automatically Gambella’s coalition.

The formation of the seven-group alliance has created a new political map across Ethiopia. But Gambella is not one of the seven members announced in September. That fact deserves attention.

The coalition includes movements from Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz, among others.

Its geographical reach is therefore substantial. Yet geographical proximity does not automatically mean shared political interests. Gambella’s interests cannot simply be assumed to be identical to those of any other region.

A movement representing a large highland population may approach federalism differently from a movement representing a smaller border region. A region with a long history of political dominance at the national level may have different priorities from a region that has historically operated on the political margins.

For Gambella, the central questions should therefore be: Who protects regional autonomy? Who guarantees the security of civilians? Who respects existing regional boundaries? Who protects Gambella’s constitutional rights? And who provides a credible political mechanism for resolving disputes without another cycle of armed conflict?

Those questions should matter more than which national political camp happens to be gaining ground at a particular moment.

This article was written by Pam Chuol Joack, a Gambella Vision Contributor and an Analyst on Gambella Affairs.